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Abstract
This paper revisits mixed findings of the expansionary fiscal spending effect in
the United States. An array of standard Vector-Autoregressive (VAR) models has
been implemented to capture inconsistent effects of the fiscal expansion. Findings
in this paper consistently reveal that without considering the influence of transfer
payments, state and local government spending, and the timing of sample, measuring
the effect of expanded government purchases along would result in an upward bias of
the comprehensive fiscal stimulus effect. This paper questions the validity of using
government purchases alone to precisely evaluate the effect of fiscal expansion.
Keywords: Fiscal Expansion; Government Spending; the Great Recession; Vector-
Autoregressive Model; Cholesky Decomposition; Impulse Response Function
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1 Introduction
The magnitude of expansionary fiscal effects on the economy has long been a heated debate
in macroeconomics. After the implementation of the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act (ARRA) in 2009, an extensive literature has grappled with this debate. For those studies
that are mainly the echoes of the new Keynesian approach, the gist of their arguments are
primarily about the positive stimulating effect of the fiscal expansion, for example, Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1992), Devereux, Head, and Laphan (1996), Fata´s and Mihov (2001),
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2005), Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s (2007). Other
studies tend to find either limited or negative influences of expansionary fiscal policy, for
example, Aiyagari, Chirstiano, and Eichenbaum (1992), Hall (1986), Ramey and Shapiro
(1998), Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004),
Cavallo (2005), Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Ramey (2012), Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy
(2013), and Kim and Jia (2018). In general, estimates of expansionary fiscal effects are quite
varied across studies, and a definitive consensus has not been reached thus far.
Regardless of those inconclusive arguments about fiscal expansion effects, this paper
questions the validity of using government purchases alone to conclude the comprehensive
effect of fiscal expansion. For example, I am wondering if the expanded government purchase
alone is an ideal proxy of a stimulating fiscal policy? Then, how do federal purchases and
state and local spending affect the economy differently? Also, does the intervention of 2007
recession change the effectiveness of expansionary fiscal policy thereafter?
It’s well-known that many papers estimate the fiscal effect by primarily focusing on
government purchases—the sum of the government consumption and the gross investment,
usually end up with conclusions that the expansionary fiscal policy has positive influence on
economic activities, such as output, consumption and real wages (Baxter and King (1993),
Fata´s and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), McGrattan and Ohanian (2008), Hall
(2009), Pappa (2009), Monacelli, Perotti and Trigari (2010), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012), Leeper, Traum and Walker (2015), and Fishback and Kachanovskaya (2015)). How-
ever, such conclusion suffers two major cursoriness: first, it omits the influence of expanded
transfer payment, which is often an important component of the fiscal stimulus package. For
example, Giambattista and Pennings (2017) uncovered that 75 % of the increase in the U.S.
government spending during the Great Recession (2007-2009) consisted of transfers; Oh and
Reis (2012) find the median share of transfer payments in the increased government spending
could be as high as 64% in their sample of countries, including the U.S. Cogan and Taylor
(2012) even question how much of government purchase is actually multiplied by expan-
sionary fiscal packages? The second cursoriness is the fact that most government purchases
used in previous studies were including the state and local government purchase, which is
not directly injected as the stimulating spending in the national fiscal stimulus package. So
even if the expanded state and local government spending often positively affects economic
activities, it does not fully guarantee a positive stimulation from the federal purchases.
In this paper, alternative identifications of the fiscal expansion shock have been identified
based on a reduced-form VAR model. Following the recursive Cholesky decomposition, I
derive impulse responses to different government spending shocks. Simultaneously, I generate
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such responses within two different sample periods to observe the influence of 2007 recession.
The major contributions of this paper are threefold. First, even if government purchases
have a more positive influence on economic activities, the completed stimulus package often
generates much less positive effect due to the intervention of expanded transfer payments.
Second, over 50% of expanded government purchases are made by the state and local gov-
ernment, the federal purchase itself has a very limited stimulating effect. Third, with the
intervention of the 2007 recession, fiscal expansion effects get significantly weaker in con-
trast to the pre-crisis period. All findings reinforce the risk of overstating the effect of the
expansionary fiscal policy by focus only on the work of government purchases.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Detailed information of the empirical
model is provided in Section 2. Data description and the primary findings are discussed in
Section 3. In order to comparatively study findings in this paper with those in previous
literature, an extensive discussion is developed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 provides the
concluding remark.
2 Empirical Model
In order to capture the fiscal expansion shock, a standard Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR)
model is applied. The basic setting of this model is:
xt = A(L)xt−1 + et, (1)
where xt is an (n·1) vector containing n variables in the system; A(L) is the vector of lag
operator polynomials, see equation 2, which includes up to p lags. et is the vector of reduced
form error terms. The coefficient matrix of this VAR is identified by A. The right-hand side
of equation 1 includes all predetermined variables, and the error terms are assumed to be
serially uncorrelated.
A(L) =
p∑
i=1
AiL
i (2)
This paper is particularly interested in variables as it’s listed below 1:
xt = [gt yt| sntt taxrt intst monyt]′ (3)
gt alternatively denotes different types of government spending: government expenditures
2,
government purchases3, transfer payments, and state and local government spending. In
1The order of variables is subject to the change of government spending type.
2The sum of “government purchases” and “transfer payments”, or the sum of “federal government ex-
penditures” and “state & local government expenditures”.
3According to the NIPA Guide of the United States, it stands for government consumption expenditures
and gross investment, “the measure of government sector final demand, consists of two major components:
Current consumption expenditures by general government and gross investment by both general government
and government enterprises”.
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which,
Government Expenditures = Government Purchases + Transfer Payments
and,
Government Purchases = Government Consumption Expenditures
+Government Gorss Investment
yt is a scalar (or vector) of interested variables, such as total GDP (rgdpt), consumption
(cont) and investment (ivtt). The sign “|” denotes the possible ordering shuﬄe between gt
and yt. I am trying to incorporate the influence of business cycle into the calibration of the
fiscal expansion effect, so gt is only ordered first when it does not include the automatic
stabilizer4, otherwise, it will be ordered after the business cycle variable yt. Besides, I have
sntt denotes a scalar of consumer sentiment index; taxrt is the federal government current
tax receipts as a share of nominal GDP; intst is the secondary market 3-month treasury bill
yield, and monyt is the M2 money stock. For the purpose of stationarity, all the data is
demeaned and detrended prior to the estimation5.
In order to compare the fiscal expansion effect, two VAR(p) identification schemes have
been employed in this paper. The first identification scheme (TGDP model) is employed
when the yt is defined as total GDP. This setting of model is motivated by Fata´s and Mihov
(2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Bachmann and Sims (2012), and Corsetti, Meier and
Mu¨ller (2012a). The second identification scheme (CI model) focuses on the private sector,
similar with Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido and Valle´s (2007), Fishback and Kachanovskaya (2010),
Ramey (2011, 2012), and Perotti (2014), private consumption (cont) and private investment
(ivtt) are treated as yt in equation 3. For details, please see the equation group below.
TGDP : xt = [gt rgdpt| sntt taxrt intst monyt]′
CI : xt = [gt cont ivtt| sntt taxrt intst monyt]′ (4)
The calibration of equations 4 could capture the contemporaneous influence from the
change of business cycle on automatic stabilizers and further generate more realistic impulse
responses to the government spending shock. This framework is also applied by previous
literatures, such as Kim and Roubini (2008), and Kim and Jia (2018). To clarify the logic,
I rewrite the benchmark equation 1 into the format of equation 5. See details below:gtyt
Zt
 =
 g¯ty¯t
Z¯t
+ P∑
i=0
a11 a12 a13a21 a22 a23
Γ31 Γ32 Γ33
i  egt−ieyt−i
EZt−i
 (5)
4In this paper, the primary proxy of automatic stabilizer is the transfer payment, tax is one of the control
variables
5According to Sims and Watson (1990), data in VAR system does not need to be detrended since it
might remove important information of the comovements among endogenous variables. However, following
the majority view, Enders (2004) points out that the data in VAR should mimic the true data generating,
especially if the major purpose is to estimate a structure VAR model.
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Where Zt stands for the vector of control variables,
Zt = [sntt taxrt intst monyt]
′ (6)
and Γ is a (4×4) coefficient matrix for each control variable. The intercept vector [g¯t y¯t Z¯t]′
can be dropped due to the primarily demeaned and de-trended data set.
In order to understand the initial ordering shuﬄe between gt and yt, I will only focus on
those two variables start from equation 7. The error terms [egt−i eyt−i ]
′ could be composited
by primitive shocks [εgt−i εyt−i ]
′. Knowing that γ12 captures the contemporaneous effect of
yt on gt, and γ21 captures the current effect of gt on yt.[
egt
eyt
]
=
1
1− γ12γ21
[
1 −γ12
−γ21 1
] [
εgt
εyt
]
(7)
For only gt and yt, after integrated with 7, equation 5 could be rewritten as:[
gt
yt
]
=
[
g¯t
y¯t
]
+
1
1− γ12γ21
P∑
i=0
[
a11 a12
a21 a22
]i [
1 −γ12
−γ21 1
] [
εgt
εyt
]
(8)
Eventually, I could derive the impulse response element ηi as:
ηi =
Bi
1− γ12γ21
[
1 −γ12
−γ21 1
]
(9)
where,
Bi =
P∑
i=0
[
a11 a12
a21 a22
]i [
εgt
εyt
]
(10)
According to the derivation of equations above, in order to address the underlying “under-
identification” issue of the impulse response function, I implement the recursive Choleski
Decomposition and add a restriction as γ12 = 0. This is turning off the contemporaneous
influence from yt to gt , which makes practical sense if gt denotes the government purchase
and ranks the first. The reasons are, first, government purchases do not include transfer
payments, which would often be influenced by the current economic fluctuation; second,
wheels of fiscal policy often spin slowly and deliberately due to the implementation lag 6,
government purchases usually can not quickly respond to the change of economic activities
within one quarter.
However, if gt stands for other types of government spending that include the automatic
stabilizer, in order to incorporate the instantaneous impact from the business cycle variable
yt, I put yt in front of gt when I am testing the impact of fiscal expansion. One limitation
of this identification is that the initial response of economic activities to the shock of fiscal
expansion would be recorded as zero, due to the coefficient constraint.
6The time lag between when government decides to implement a new fiscal policy and when it’s actually
enacted through the market.
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3 Empirical Findings
3.1 Data Description
All the data in this paper is on a quarterly basis, and most data is collected from the
Federal Reserve Economic Data7 with one exception: the consumer sentiment index (sentt).
The quarterly consumer sentiment index is collected from the Survey of Consumers8of the
University of Michigan. For data transformation, a natural logarithm has been applied to
this index.
The full sample period in this paper is stretching from 1960Q1 to 2017Q3, which includes
the Great Recession period that started in 2007. All public and private spending variables
such as the multiple types of government spending, total GDP (tgdpt), private consumption
(cont), and private investment (ivtt) are in the format of real value per capita. Additionally,
they are all in logarithmic format.
Under the VAR model, multiple types of government spending variables have been
plugged in alternatively. This includes not only the total government expenditures, but
also the disaggregated spendings, for example, government purchases, transfer payment, and
state and local government spending.
3.2 Primary Results
3.2.1 Fiscal Expansion and Total GDP
In order to study fiscal policy effects on the total output, Figure 1 displays impulse responses
of total GDP to various government spending shocks. The solid line traces down the impulse
responses in the full sample, which considers the Great Recession of 2007 as an intervention.
The dash-dot line is the response of total GDP in the sub-sample (“pre-crisis”) , which
depicts how the fiscal shock works before the Great Recession period.
Figure 1 around here
Given a quick glance of results in Figure 1, government purchases are positively stimu-
lating the total GDP. Transfer payments, on the other hand, constantly generate negative
impact on the total GDP. Total expenditures normally do not exhibit as much positive in-
fluence as the government purchases do. Because government expenditures are the sum of
government purchases and transfer payments, and expanded transfer payments are often
much greater than expanded government purchases (see Figure 3). So it makes sense that
the effect of expansionary expenditures would be more influenced by transfer payments and
running less stimulating effect than the purchases.
7Federal Reserve Economics Data: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
8University of Michigan: Consumer Sentiment, retrieved from https://data.sca.isr.umich.edu/data-
archive/mine.php.
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As to the timing issue, in Figure 1, the total GDP almost always has a more positive
response to fiscal expansion shocks before the 2007 recession, regardless of which specific
government spending variable is utilized. This result reveals that the 2007 recession has
substantially muted the positive influence of the expansionary fiscal policy thereafter.
3.2.2 Fiscal Expansion and Consumption
As long as I am interested in the stimulating effect of fiscal policy, the private sector should
not be overlooked. Except for total GDP, private consumption is another important target to
be stimulated. Similarly, the gross government expenditures have much less positive effect on
consumption, see Figure 2. This again is due to the negative influence of transfer payments
and how big a proportion has been shared by transfer payments in the government total
expenditures.
Figure 2 around here
If I shift the focus on time-variant estimates in Figure 2, again, consumption is more
responsive before the great recession of 2007, which indicates a weaker expansionary fiscal
effect due to the intervention of the Great Recession.
4 Extensive Discussion
4.1 Is Expanded Government Purchases A Good Proxy?
Across previous studies, papers that often find very positive effect of expansionary fiscal
policy usually treat government purchases as the primary proxy of expanded fiscal spending.
For example, with government purchases, Baxter and King (1993) states that the fiscal
multiplier could be greater than 1 in the long run; this strong positive influence is also
possible to be observed in the short run, as long as labor supply is highly elastic. Following
this, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) estimates the government purchases multiplier
could be as large as 1.5. Later, Fazzari, Morley and Panovaska (2015) also estimated a high
purchases multiplier around 1.6 for the “low-capacity” regime.
However, government fiscal stimulus is not only about expanding purchases, but also
about increasing transfer payments (Oh and Reis (2012), Mehrotra(2018), Giambattista and
Pennings (2017)), let alone transfer payments often expand much greater than government
purchases (see Figure 3) in total expanded spending. Especially during the “in-crisis” pe-
riod, in Figure 3, transfers increase more than 65% , while purchases are only expanded
by about 20%. Unlike government purchases, transfer payments constantly generate nega-
tive impacts on economic activities (Churchill and Yew (2017)), see Figure 1 and Figure 2.
Apparently, while purchases have positive stimulating effect on the market, the expanded
transfer payments would attenuate this positive effect simultaneously. So using government
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purchases alone would very likely generate a result that is overvaluing the comprehensive
fiscal expansionary effect.
Figure 3 around here
4.2 Intervention of State and Local Government Spending
As long as people study effects of expanded government purchases on the economy, they
should be careful about which purchase variable has been used. Many previous studies often
use total government purchase instead of federal purchase alone to measure the expansion-
ary fiscal effect (Baxter and King (1993), Fata´s and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti
(2002), Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s (2007), McGrattan and Ohanian (2008), Hall (2009),
Mountford and Uhlig (2009)), in which state and local government spending is also included.
However, according to Hubbard and O’brien (2015), spending policies implemented by state
and local governments are not directly affecting the national economy, whereby the fiscal
policy only refers to actions of the federal government.
Recall what has been presented in Figure 4, state and local purchases often takes up a
larger proportion of total government purchases than the federal purchase does. In order
to have a more precise estimate for the effect of expansionary fiscal policy, it’s important
to isolate federal purchases from state and local spending, then observe how would output
respond to federal purchase and state and local spending differently. Results are presented
in Figure 5.
Figure 4 and Figure 5 around here
Apparently, state and local government spending accounts for most of the positive stimu-
lation, because total output has more positive response to the expansion of state and local
spending. The federal government purchases, on the other hand, have very limited stimulat-
ing effect. This reinforces that using total government purchases to measure the effectiveness
of expansionary fiscal policy would end up overestimating the stimulating effect.
5 Conclusion
Facing various arguments about the fiscal expansion effect among previous studies, this
paper questions the validity of using government total purchases alone to conclude the com-
prehensive effect of fiscal expansion. I start this argument asking a few questions such as
whether the expanded government purchase alone is an ideal proxy of a stimulating fiscal
8
package? How does federal purchases and state and local spending affect the economy dif-
ferently? Does the great recession in 2007 change the effectiveness pattern of expansionary
fiscal policy overall?
In order to address the first question, this paper distinguishes “government purchases”
from “government expenditures”. It turns out that government purchases alone generate
very dissimilar stimulating effect on the economy in contrast to government expenditures.
The main driver of such divergence is the transfer payment. According to empirical results in
this paper, expanded transfer payments almost always have negative impact on economic ac-
tivities, and this negative impact is quite robust across different identification schemes. This
provides the clue that why the expansion of government expenditures often generates less
positive influence than the expanded purchases, because the negative impact of transfer pay-
ments erode the positive stimulating effect from government purchases. This finding reveals
that by using government purchases alone would easily generate an overstated stimulating
effect of fiscal expansions.
Another noteworthy finding is that state and local government spending often has a
stronger stimulating effect than the federal purchases. Due to the fact that spending policies
implemented by state and local governments do not directly affect the national economy,
using total government purchases to evaluate the effectiveness of fiscal expansion could result
in an upward bias.
As to the timing issue, the Great Recession of 2007 plays an important role to intervene
the fiscal stimulus effect. Empirical results in this paper present a fact that with the in-
tervention of the Great Recession, the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus would be prominently
weakened.
Following all the empirical findings in this paper, I don’t deny the fact that government
purchases often exhibit a positive influence on total output and consumption in the United
States. However, by only using government purchases to measure the effectiveness of fiscal
stimulating package is not quite precise. Base on all the concerns discussed in this paper,
when policymakers plan to adjust the fiscal policy in oder to stimulate the economy, it’s
important that transfer payments will not be overlooked and the state and local government
spending will not be mixed in.
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Figure 1: Government Spending Shocks on Total GDP
Note: Data source is US. Bureau of Economic Analysis, selected series are retrieved from FRED,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The result is based on the 1-standard deviation confidence band
(68% CI) and 100 times non-parametric bootstrap simulation. Time span of full sample is 1960Q1-
2017Q3, and 1960Q1-2007Q3 for sub-sample.
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Figure 2: Government Spending Shocks on Consumption
Note: The data source is US. Bureau of Economic Analysis, selected series are retrieved from FRED,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The result is based on the 1-standard deviation confidence band
(68% CI) and 100 times non-parametric bootstrap simulation. Time span of the full sample is 1960Q1-
2017Q3, and 1960Q1-2007Q3 for the “pre-crisis” period.
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Figure 3: Growth of Federal Purchases v.s. Transfers: quarterly mean (%)
Note: The data source is originally from US. Bureau of Economic Analysis, selected series are retrieved
from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The “in-crisis” period is particularly focus on the Great
Economic Recession period: 2007Q4-2009Q2, which is defined by NBER US Business Cycle Expansions
and Contractions; “pre-crisis” is 1960Q1-2007Q3; “post-crisis” is 2009Q3-2017Q2; “full-sample”
is 1960Q1-2017Q3.
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Figure 4: The Share of Total Purchases by Governments:
Federal v.s. State & Local
Note: The solid line depicts the state & local government purchases share of total purchases. The
long-dash line is the federal purchases share of total purchases. The bar chart shows the differences
between federal and state and local shares. The reference line in dash is indicating the break-even
point of the differences. Data source is US. Bureau of Economic Analysis, selected series are retrieved
from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Time span is 1960Q1-2017Q3.
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Figure 5: Government Purchases Shocks on Total GDP
Note: The data source is US. Bureau of Economic Analysis, selected series are retrieved from FRED,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The result is based on the 1-standard deviation confidence band
(68% CI) and 100 times non-parametric bootstrap simulation. Time span of the full sample is 1960Q1-
2017Q3, and 1960Q1-2007Q3 for the sub-sample.
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